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Abstract 
 
Previous research on relationship lending has paid very little attention to the role of trust. Trust might be ex-
pected to reduce agency costs, perceived credit risk and thus the request for personal collateral. Trustworthiness 
is associated with three attributes of SME owner/managers’: ability, benevolence and integrity. We hypothe-
sised that loan managers’ assessment of the trustworthiness of owner/managers is negatively associated with the 
personal collateral demanded by banks. Using the quantitative and qualitative data about 457 SMEs-bank rela-
tionships in North East Italy, we tested this hypothesis. The results show that trust has a minor role in reducing 
the request of collateral. 
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I. Introduction 
The banking system is essential for the life of firms and especially for small and me-
dium enterprises, as they do not usually have access to equity capital markets. The lending 
process is very complex and involves the risk evaluation of the firms. Banks rely on different 
lending technologies and tend to use more than one technology at a time (Berger and Udell, 
2006). Among the various lending technologies, relationship lending plays a peculiar role 
since it supports SMEs in accessing credit. Indeed, in this case banks rely on various sources 
of private information gathered through contact with firms, their owners and the local com-
munity in order to evaluate firms’ creditworthiness (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995 and Ber-
ger and Udell, 1995). Personal contacts and informal channels can help banks to deal with 
SMEs opaqueness and the related difficulty of evaluating risk. Thus, small businesses can be 
better off as a result of easier access to credit. 
Previous research on relationship lending has focused attention on a set of variables 
such as relationship length, closeness of the relationship, the concentration of lending rela-
tionships on a few banks and the quality of the relationship. Very little attention has been 
paid to trust. 
Interestingly, when a bank makes a decision to provide credit, even though the rela-
tionship created is a contractual relationship, it is underpinned by an assessment of trust. Lit-
erature on trust stresses that high levels of trust encourage trustworthy behaviour (Noote-
boom, 2002) and that trust can play an important role in reducing agency problems (such as 
moral hazard and adverse selection), in cutting transaction costs (Macaulay, 1963, Noote-
boom et al., 1997) as well as the expenses of monitoring and control (see Lewicki et al., 
1998). Thus, a trusting relationship may benefit banks and SMEs as illustrated theoretically 
by the model proposed by Howorth and Moro (2006) who develop a proposition that states 
that the “Requests for collateral and personal guarantees are negatively related to bank 
manager’s trust.” This study investigates whether the proposition is supported by empirical 
evidence. More specifically, the present study tests whether the level of trust placed by bank 
managers in SME owner/managers is associated with the request for personal collateral in the 
form of either personal guarantees and/or the pledging of personal assets. Trust is measured 
employing a vector derived from Mayer et al., (1995).  
The present study relies on a unique dataset of 457 observations collected in the Ital-
ian North East during the period 2004-2007 that is used to test the research hypothesis. In ad-
dition, the researchers conducted a set of interviews with managers of the banks involved in 
the research and with SME owner/managers. During these interviews the econometric results 
were discussed. 
Our econometric findings suggest that trust has a minor role in the reduction of the 
personal collateral. Interviews with loan managers and entrepreneurs indicate that, on the one 
hand, the collateral is requested at the beginning of the relationship (when trust is inevitably 
low) and on the other hand that both loan managers and entrepreneurs exhibit inertia. Our in-
terviews suggest that loan managers like to be “over hedged” with extra guarantees, while 
entrepreneurs are surprisingly not particularly sensitive to the additional risk they incur be-
cause of the personal collateral provided. In fact, they are not very careful about the personal 
collateral at the point that, sometimes, they are not even aware about the personal collateral 
provided to the bank. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature on relationship 
lending and trust, explaining the role of trust as an independent variable. Section 3 describes 
the research methodology and how variables modelled are operationalised. In Section 4 the 
results are reported and discussed. Section 5 draws conclusion and identifies areas for future 
research. 
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II. Overview of the Literature 
Banks are a very important source of finance for SMEs. SMEs tend to leverage bank 
debt in preference to equity and after having exploited other sources of finance such as trade 
credit (Howorth, 2001) and bootstrap finance, which can only partially cover firms’ financial 
needs (Wingborg and Landström, 2000). In addition, banks look at cash flow generated by 
the projects to evaluate firms’ creditworthiness. This approach differs from that used by ven-
ture capitalists, business angels and by the owner-manager, as well (Mason and Stark, 2004). 
The use of bank debt to finance firms and projects is at least partially affected by the socioec-
onomic and legal context: however one finds it in large firms and small ones; in both devel-
oped and developing economies; in Continental Europe as well as in the Japanese and Anglo-
Saxon worlds. Research on SMEs suggests that the adoption of Basel II has adversely affect-
ed their access to credit, in particular for financing R&D (Scellato and Ughetto, 2010). As a 
result, the firms are required now to provide more guarantees irrespective of whether they can 
access loan guarantees provided by national or local financial/governmental institutions 
(Camino and Cardone, 1999). 
Research on lending demonstrates that the lending technologies can be grouped into 
categories (Berger et al., 2005): financial statement lending (based on the evaluation of in-
formation from the financial statements); asset based lending (based on the provision of col-
lateral and its quality); credit scoring lending (based on statistical probability analysis). These 
three categories are usually grouped together and labelled transaction lending; the risk eval-
uation is based on available factual and public information, and they are used for loans that 
are mainly for non- recurrent needs. The fourth category is relationship lending which targets 
firms’ recurrent needs and focuses on the fact that improvements in the relationships between 
banks and businesses may help the banks in evaluating firms’ riskiness, increasing credit 
availability, reducing the cost of credit and the pledging of collateral (Agarwal and Haus-
wald, 2008). In the case of relationship lending, the information is gathered beyond the rela-
tively transparent data available in the official documents; the information gathering is 
through a continuous process; the information remains confidential to the provider of funds 
who uses it as a basis for taking other lending decisions (Berger, 1999). Relationship lending 
is found to affect the maturity of the debt differently in different countries (Hernández-
Cánova and Koëter-Kant, 2008). 
In fact, the different lending technologies are not mutually exclusive, as banks tend to 
use more than one technology at a time (Berger and Udell, 2006). Relationship lending re-
search pays particular attention to small firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995) because 
they are informationally opaque (Berger et al., 2001) and therefore their lending process 
might be more profoundly affected by relationships. Later research (for instance, Harhoff and 
Körting, 1998 but also Akhavein et al., 2004) not only confirms this point but also explicates 
the various factors that affect relationship lending. 
 
II.1. The Request for Collateral 
The firm and its owner/manager can be asked to provide collateral and guarantees 
(see Berger et al., 2006) as conditions for being granted the credit it needs. Collateral gives 
the lender a claim over specific assets which are controlled by the secured claimants who can 
prevent the borrower from selling or disposing of them. In contrast, a guarantee is a general 
claim and the borrower can sell his/her assets without any limits at any time before the lender 
exerts a claim on them because of a default in repaying principal and/or interest. The Italian 
bank system relies on personal commitments as shown by Zecchini and Ventura (2009) who 
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found that more than 83% of Italian small firms’ owners/managers provide personal collateral 
or personal guarantees to the banks in order to access credit. 
Literature on bank lending points out that personal commitments have two different 
roles: the first is to reduce the loss in case of default (loss at default) for the lender (Blazy and 
Weill, 2006) providing the bank with a hedge in case of default (Voordeckers and Steijvers, 
2006). In support of this role of personal collateral, Jiménez and Saurina (2004) show that 
collateralised loans are those with a higher probability of default. A second role personal 
commitments have, is to align borrower’s and lender’s interests, that is to address problems 
of moral hazard and adverse selection, reducing implicitly the probability of default. The ar-
gument is that personal commitments increase the owner/managers’ stake, making them exert 
additional effort in the venture. Avery et al. (1998) as well as Voordeckers and Steijvers’ 
(2006) research, supports the view that commitments are used to influence borrower behav-
iour to reduce the probability of default; Steijvers et al. (2010) find that the total value of the 
assets plays an important role in the pledging of collateral. 
Banks’ decisions regarding the pledging of personal collateral are affected by various 
factors. Scholars point out the role of both the length of the relationship and the age of the 
firm. There is evidence that the probability of gaining credit increases (and the request for 
collateral decreases) with the age of the firm (Akhavein et al., 2004) since newer firms are 
considered to be the riskiest. Newer firms have to gain market share, survive the start up pe-
riod getting established and the potential lender is uncertain about the competence, skills and 
trustworthiness of the management (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Berger and Udell, 1995). Ji-
ménez et al. (2006) explain that younger firms are more prone to provide collateral as a way 
of signalling that they have no problems of moral hazard. The older the firm, the longer the 
current ownership and the longer the relationship with the bank, the less the collateral re-
quested (Harhoff and Körting, 1998, Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). Indeed, firms with 
more experience and with a long relationship provide banks with a great amount of private 
information, giving them the possibility to discriminate between firms with poor track rec-
ords and those that present moral hazard and adverse selection risks (Diamond, 1984, Berger 
et al., 2005). Longhofer and Santos (2000) point out that personal commitment can be a sup-
porting factor in building relationship lending. The explanation provided is based on the idea 
that if banks are junior to other creditors, they may benefit little in bad states from additional 
investments in the firm and hence will have little incentive to build up relationships that 
might allow them to determine the value of such an investment. 
The quality of the relationship is also a matter of closeness (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994): the closer the relationship the easier for the bank to access the information it needs. In 
addition, the value of private information depends on the number of parties collecting the in-
formation, as the greater the concentration, the more complete the information received. 
Thus, the more the relationships are concentrated on a few banks, the lower the request for 
collateral will be. 
Finally, relationship lending is a matter of quality of information, where the higher its 
quality, the easier for the bank to evaluate the riskiness of the firm and hence the lower the 
request for collateral (Harhoff and Körting, 1998). Research by Lehmann and Neuberger 
(2001) looks at a set of variables that are intended to measure the interaction activity between 
bank manager and the SME owner/manager. These authors find a negative correlation be-
tween the interactional variables and the collateral request from the bank (i.e. greater interac-
tion is associated with less collateral). A corollary to the Harhoff and Körting (1998) and 
Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) findings is provided by Berlin and Mester (1998), who argue 
that in local and more concentrated markets, lenders have better information about borrowers. 
Thus, in general lenders ask for less private collateral. 
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II.2 Trust 
As the foregoing discussion of the relevant literature demonstrates, previous studies 
on lending relationships only peripherally consider trust among the covariates. To the best of 
our knowledge, in the banking finance literature, there are four studies that consider trust as 
one of the independent variables (Harhoff and Körting, 1998, Ferrary, 2003, Saparito and 
Gopalakrishnan, 2009 and Howorth and Moro, forthcoming). Ferrary (2003) investigates how 
bank managers can gain trust from networks of customers by developing social capital; 
Saparito and Gopalakrishnan (2009) investigate knowledge transfer in lending relationships; 
Howorth and Moro (2012) investigate the impact of trusting relationships on interest rate. 
Harhoff and Körting’s (1998) research investigates the determinants of interest and collateral. 
Although they consider trust among the covariates, the role of trust is not a major feature of 
their research. Moreover, these authors simply asked the bank managers whether they trust or 
do not trust the owner/manager, using a simple dummy variable to indicate the response. 
Thus, the role of trust is under-investigated even though it is far too important to be over-
looked (Nooteboom, 2002). Bromiley and Harris (2006) argue that excluding trust from rela-
tionship models reduces the explanatory capability of the postulated models. Incorporating 
trust shifts the attention from the traditional approach linked to transaction cost economics 
and agency theory to a wider (and more complex) approach where interpersonal ties and rela-
tionships are taken into consideration (Barney, 1990). 
The importance of trust in human relations is highlighted by various authors. The lit-
erature on trust emphasizes that its presence reduces agency problems (e.g. Ring and Van de 
Ven 1992); cuts transaction costs (e.g. Macaulay, 1963); reduces expenses of monitoring and 
control (e.g. Zand, 1972); decreases the use of legalistic remedies (Sitkin and Roth, 1993); 
improves relationships (e.g. Fisman and Khanna, 1999); supports cooperation (e.g. Doz, 
1996); aids decision taking in a situation where information is scarce (e.g. Luhmann, 2000). 
Trust is closely linked to ethics, it is culturally specific (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994) and is 
a construct common to various disciplines from sociology and psychology, to economics, and 
organisational relations (see Rousseau, et al., 1998). Trust requires a previous engagement of 
one person and presupposes a situation of risk where the damage is greater than the ad-
vantage. Therefore, trust is different from confidence which implies that one does not consid-
er the alternative opportunities. 
An additional layer of complexity is linked to the fact that trust is not static, since it 
can evolve from a weak form to a strong one and vice versa. The weakest form of trust is cal-
culus trust, which is based on a calculation of the costs of trusting other versus its benefits 
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) and can be easily broken. When this form of trust applies, gov-
ernance devices are more prevalent and may include detailed contracts (Barney and Hansen, 
1994). Trust may evolve in the form of knowledge based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) 
that derives from predictable behaviour based on prior knowledge of the trustee. Such trust is 
based on relationships and reciprocal testing and increases with regular communication 
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). The strongest form of trust is unconditional or identification 
based trust which implies identification with others’ ideas, desires and intentions and a strong 
reciprocal understanding in terms of values and standards of behaviour. It is independent of 
any specific situation (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Here, the psychological contract substi-
tutes for formal contractual safeguards. 
Mayer et al. (1995) suggest that trustworthiness is based on three factors: ability, be-
nevolence and integrity. Ability looks at aspects such as skills and competence, it is domain 
specific and it cannot necessarily be generalised to other situations. Trustworthiness in the 
SME owner/manager’s business ability will reduce the bank manager’s perception of the risk 
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of default. Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to voluntarily do good to 
the trustor: in the bank – owner/manager relationship, it can increase the bank managers’ ex-
pectation that the SME owner/manager will meet the firm’s obligations (repayment, cove-
nants, etc.) to the bank. Integrity is the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of 
principles considered acceptable to the trustor. Integrity is not linked to skills or competences 
nor is it relationship specific (morality/ethics exist over and above any particular relation-
ship). Integrity is an intrinsic part of an individual’s commitments to moral principles (Smith, 
1759), making it a personal characteristic of the owner/manager. In lending relationships, in-
tegrity can help to reduce the expectation of moral hazard, as well as increasing the perceived 
reliability of information supplied by the SMEs owners/managers. 
The literature on trust indicates its relevance as a means of reducing transaction and 
agency costs. At the same time, the literature on relationship lending stresses the importance 
of relationships, suggesting that they can be helpful in order to address agency issues and 
moral hazard risk. Thus, improved relationships can increase credit availability, and also re-
duce the request for collateral. Interestingly, by conflating the two streams of research (trust 
and relationship lending), a question arises: does trust decrease the request for personal col-
lateral that is the collateral provided by the shareholders and managers of the firm? 
According to Mayer et al. (1995) as adapted by Howorth and Moro (2006), the trust 
which is bestowed on SMEs owners/managers is expected to be based on an assessment of 
the SME owner/manager’s integrity, benevolence and ability. Thus, trust can influence and 
reduce the request for collateral. Howorth and Moro (2006) develop a proposition that states 
that the “Requests for collateral and personal guarantees are negatively related to bank 
manager’s trust.” This study investigates whether the proposition is supported by empirical 
evidence. 
 
III. Research Method and Data Collection 
In undertaking the empirical research for this study, we employed a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative research was based on a large-scale 
survey of bank managers. The main body of the survey was aimed at collecting information 
on managerial and financial aspects of the client firm, along with various items which are 
taken as indicators of the three trustworthiness factors (integrity, ability and benevolence). 
The data obtained were used to derive measures of trust and of a number of other variables 
hypothesised as influencing the personal collateral, in order to facilitate a quantitative analy-
sis of the impact of these variables on the amount of private collateral requested by the banks. 
Factor analysis was employed to test whether trust could be derived from the vector of items. 
The research (whether requests for collateral are negatively related to bank managers’ trust) 
was then investigated using logit regression with a bootstrap estimation of the standard errors 
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1998). In fact, the dependent variable is a dummy one that assumes 
value 1 if the shareholders/managers provide personal collateral and 0 otherwise. 
The qualitative component of our research was based on a series of interviews with 
SME owner/managers and bank managers, using a semi-structured questionnaire to elicit 
their respective perceptions of the trust relationship and its implications for the pledging of 
collateral.  
 
III.1 Operationalisation of the variables 
In order to operationalise the model, in addition to the dependent variable (COLL) 
and the independent variable (TRUST) we employed a set of control variables. The foregoing 
literature review indicated that there are a number of variables that could influence the re-
quest for personal guarantees. However, our interest in this study is to investigate the role of 
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trust on the request for personal guarantees. We therefore divided the potential explanatory 
variables into three categories. In the first category we grouped together variables which are 
exogenous to the firm. In the second category the variables related to the firm’s own charac-
teristics are included. These two categories are collectively called ‘hard variables’ as they 
represent hard information or data. In the third category, we grouped together variables that 
measure the strength of relationship. 
III.1.a Dependent Variable 
Personal commitments can be measured in two different ways: by looking at the value 
of the assets provided by managers and shareholders; by simply determining whether they 
provide personal commitments. The former approach is difficult to implement as reliable data 
is hard to obtain: entrepreneurs and managers are unwilling to disclose the value of their per-
sonal wealth. Even when an assets list is provided, values can be difficult to ascertain in the 
absence of market prices. Thus, collateral and guarantees are measured using a dummy varia-
ble that simply states whether the granting of credit is facilitated by some kind of personnel 
commitment. Therefore, we operationalise the dependent variable (COLL) by using a dummy 
variable that has the value of 1 when the granting of credit is facilitated by personal commit-
ments and 0 otherwise. 
III.1.b The Independent Variables 
Trust is measured according to a vector of 10 items that measure the three trust factors 
(Mayer et al., 1995) as reported in Table 1. The bank managers in our survey were asked to 
evaluate the items on a 5 point Likert-type scale between “I totally disagree” (1) to “I totally 
agree” (5) except for the last item (INT3) where they are asked to evaluate between “I totally 
advise against” (1) to “I totally advise”. Each item was based on previously established trust 
inventories (e.g. Cummings and Bromiley, 1996, Currall and Judge, 1995, Mayer and Davies, 
1999, Jarvenpaa et al., 1998).  
Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) and Mayer and Davies (1999) suggest measuring ability by us-
ing items that are focused on the use and the selection of firm’s resources. In addition, they 
suggest focussing attention on trustee skills. Indeed, Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) measure trust by 
using items like “I feel very confident about the team member skills” and Mayer and Davies 
(1999) use items such as “Top management is very capable in performing its job”. Our four 
ability items capitalise on these previous approaches.  
Benevolence is traditionally measured by looking at the opinion the trustor has about 
trustee orientation towards balancing his/her interests with those of the commercial partners. 
Thus, Mayer and Davis (1999) uses “Top management is very concerned about my welfare”, 
“My needs and desires are very important to top management”, and “Top management really 
looks at what it is important for me”. Similarly, Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) use “The other team 
members are concerned about what is important to the team” or “the other team members do 
everything within their capacities to help the team perform”. Finally, Cummings and Bro-
miley (1996) use “we think people are fair in the negotiations with us” or “we think people 
behave according to the commitments”. In addition, since benevolence is linked to altruism 
(Mayer et al., 1995), whether the trustee is actively involved in the life of the community is 
also taken into account. All these aspects are mirrored by the three items we use to measure 
benevolence.  
Integrity is linked to the intention of not cheating the commercial partners, as well as 
on behaving in a manner consistent with expectations. Jarvenpaa et al. (1998) measure integ-
rity with items such as “The other team members try hard to be fair in dealing with one an-
other” and “The other team members have a strong sense of commitment”. Similarly, Mayer 
and Davies (1999) use “Top management has a strong sense of justice” or “Top management 
actions are very consistent”. Cummings and Bromiley (1996) use items such as “We think 
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that people tell the truth in the negotiations”. Our three items reflect these aspects. Table 1 
shows the items used in this research listing the sources for each item. 
Trustworthiness factors are reduced to one TRUST factor using factor analysis. This 
factor is expected to be negatively related to COLL since the higher the trust, the lower the 
probability that entrepreneurs and managers are asked to provide personal commitments. 
Data collected on trust items are reported in Table 1. The mode score is 4 (I partially 
agree) for each item except for the item “The entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of 
his/her employee” and “The entrepreneur is very involved in the community” where the 
mode score is 3 (neither agree nor disagree). The average of each item is above 3 (which 
stands for neutral). The lowest average is 3.09 (“The entrepreneur is very involved in the 
community”) while the highest is 4.11 (“The entrepreneur knows very well the market in 
which he/she operates”). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Factor analysis supports the proposition that trustworthiness factors interact and help 
jointly the development of trust. Principal components analysis was employed to reduce the 
vector of ten items into trustworthiness factors. However, empirically, the (forced) two and 
three factors models were always sub-optimal with Eigenvalues well below 1.0 for all factors 
except the first one (although the items did load as expected on components representing abil-
ity, benevolence and integrity). The PCA results indicate that perceived trustworthiness in 
this context appears to be a single complex entity that draws on ability, benevolence and in-
tegrity: the one component model was superior and had very high reliability. This is in line 
with previous research (Nooteboom et al., 1997) that found it difficult to distinguish empiri-
cally between trustworthiness factors, particularly benevolence and integrity. BEN3 (in-
volvement in community) had a low communality and was dropped from the PCA, which 
improved the reliability analysis. Thus, PCA was performed on nine items (Cronbach Alpha 
0.8806) and one factor (TRUST) was extracted.  
III.1.c Control Variables - Exogenous 
Berlin and Mester (1998) stress that in local and more concentrated markets, lenders 
have better information about borrowers since news and gossip travel fast. In such circum-
stances, lenders ask for less private commitments to compensate for the improved access to 
information. In the regressions we performed, the number of the banks that operate in each 
municipality are entered (NBANKS) and a positive relation is expected between the concen-
tration and request for collateral. The study focuses on two different regions. A dummy vari-
able (REGION) is included where 1 represents Friuli Venezia Giulia. Firms in Friuli Venezia 
Giulia have less access to grants and public sources of finance and are less protected than 
those in South Tyrol. In addition, in Friuli firms face more competition from firms which 
have headquarters outside of the region. Thus, a positive relationship is expected. The dataset 
contains data from local and large banks: a dummy variable (LOCNAT) is used to control for 
the type of bank. Large banks (1) are supposed to be less supportive and consequently a posi-
tive relation with the dependent variable is expected. 
Previous literature has suggested a positive correlation between personal commit-
ments and risk (Berger and Udell, 1995). The covariate that tries to measure the risk (at sys-
temic level) is ECON. This is an index compiled by Bank of Italy in accordance with the Eu-
ropean Central Bank, which measures the expected change in providing credit to customers. 
It is implicitly a measure of the change in perceived risk linked to change in economic cli-
mate. It is collected every three months through a survey administered to bank managers. The 
values we used are those collected by Bank of Italy in the quarter when the data were collect-
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ed from each bank. Since positive values are associated with a more stringent credit policy, a 
positive relationship between ECON and COLL is expected. 
III.1.d Control Variables - Hard 
Riskiness is linked to firm size: bigger firms need more finance on the one hand but 
they usually are considered less risky since they have more assets, a larger customer base and 
provide more sound (e.g. audited) financial reports. In addition, they have greater negotiation 
power as found by Lehmann and Neuberger (2001). In the regressions, the size of the firm is 
measured by the natural logarithm of the annual turnover (LNTURNOVER), in line with pre-
vious empirical research and a negative relation is expected. Three financing specific covari-
ates are considered: the amount of short term credit provided by the bank in the form of natu-
ral logarithm (LNSTD), the average short-term debt used (OVDUSE) and the interest rate 
charged (INTOV). These covariates are expected to be positively related to the personal 
commitments request. The greater the amount of credit provided, the greater the risk for the 
bank and the more likely the owner/manager is asked to provide some kind of hedging. The 
higher the quota of short term debt used, the greater the risk that the firm is credit constrained 
and hence the higher the perceived financial risk from the bank point of view. Regarding the 
interest rate on overdraft (INTOV), the literature stresses that when banks cannot discrimi-
nate a priori between different levels of risk for their investments because of inadequate in-
formation, they offer high/low and low/high interest – collateral pairings in order to cause 
high and low risk borrowers to self select (Bester, 1985). In this case, the pairings of inter-
est/collateral can clear the market. Clearly, there is no causation between interest and com-
mitments but according to Bester (1985) a negative correlation is expected. 
III.1.e Control Variables - Relationship 
The relationship provides the banks with additional information that helps to increase 
their knowledge of the firm. As indicated by some theoretical models, borrowing constraints 
become less strict with time because of the increased reputation of the borrower (Martinelli, 
1997). At the same time, when firms are small, they may face hold up problems (Howorth, et 
al., 2003). In line with the previous empirical research, the log of the length of the relation-
ship (LNLENGTH) is entered in the regression and a positive relationship is expected to oc-
cur, since the bank capture effect is likely to prevail over the information production effect. If 
the firm has more than a simple lending relation with the bank (for instance, it relies on the 
bank for cash management), it has the possibility to give the bank a lot of additional infor-
mation about firm performance. MULTI is a dummy variable that measures the existence of 
more than a simple lending relation. When the information is held by few or even only one 
bank manager, information dissipation is reduced: a positive relationship between the number 
of people involved in the relationship at bank level (MANAGERS) and the requirement for 
personal commitments is expected. At the same time, the lending relationship is influenced 
by bank manager perception of facing a situation with reduced information asymmetry. Pre-
vious research (Berger et al., 2001) stresses the importance of the frequency with which the 
bank managers meet firms (FREQMEET): it increases the acquisition of private information 
and helps in better evaluating the firm’s risk and, thereby, in reducing the request for private 
commitments. The same effect is expected for FREQREV which measures the intensity of 
reviewing activity, i.e. how many times in the year bank manager reassesses the credit pro-
vided to the SME. 
 
III.2 Model Specification 
The subdivision of the covariates into three sets, gave us the possibility of verifying 
which vector affects personal commitments independently of other vectors. Thus, we develop 
three different specifications as listed below: 
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Exogenous variables 
COLL = β0+(β1LOCNAT + β2NBANKS + β3REGION + β4ECON) + ε (Equation 1) 
 
Hard variables 
COLL = β0+ (β5INTOV + β6OVDUSE + β7LNTURNOVR + β8LNSTD) + ε (Equation 2) 
 
Relationship variables 
COLL = β0+ (β9LNLENGTH + β10FREQREV + β11FREQMEET + β12MANAGER + 
β13MULTI  + β14TRUST) + ε       (Equation 3) 
 
Then, in order to investigate the overall impact of different covariates, we used the 
following specification, where the three vectors are entered together 
 
COLL = β0+(β1LOCNAT + β2NBANKS + β3REGION + β4ECON) +  (β5INTOV + 
β6OVDUSE + β7LNTURNOVR + β8LNSTD) + (β9LNLENGTH + β10FREQREV + 
β11FREQMEET + β12MANAGER + β13MULTI  + β14TRUST) + ε  (Equation 4) 
 
III.3 Sample Data 
The research focuses mainly on local community banks that have the legal form of the 
Banche di Credito Cooperativo located in North East Italy. The decision to focus on these 
banks was linked to previous research that stressed local banks’ role in affecting national 
growth (Usai and Vannini, 2005) and that they have strong ties with the community. The 
sample consists of six Raiffeisenkassen and two Banche di Credito Cooperativo. In addition, 
data was collected from local branches of two large national banks. 
A sample of non-agricultural SME firms (as defined by European Community stand-
ards) was selected for each bank. The sample was built up randomly and represents between 
10% and 20% of the overall number of firms that had a credit facility with the bank (in terms 
of both short-term and long-term debt) in the case of local banks, while for large national 
banks the sample represents less than 1% of the entire population and around 5% of the local 
population of customers. The initial list contained 535 firms which provided a final dataset of 
457 useful observations (85.44%) with a turnover for the constituent firms between 13,000 
Euro and 46,900,000 Euro. A summary of the data is reported in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table II here] 
 
In the dataset, 81.10% of the firm credit is collateralised with some form of personal 
commitments. This percentage is very close to the figure reported by Zecchini and Ventura 
(2009) who, by looking at the Italian Central Bank dataset (Centrale Rischi), found that more 
than 83% of the Italian firms provide some form of personal commitments to the bank system 
in order to access the credit they need. 
 
IV. Testing the Role of Trust in the Requirement for Collateral  
The role of trust in the pledging of personal collateral was analysed both quantitative-
ly and qualitatively. We discuss first the quantitative analysis. 
IV.1 Regression Findings 
In Table 3, the results of three regressions are presented: the first considers only the 
covariates exogenous to the firm and to the relationship. The second looks only at the firm’s 
characteristics. The third one considers only the relationship between banks and firms. The 
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number of observations considered is slightly different among the specifications, but the t-
tests on different datasets show no significant difference. Interestingly, the first specification 
is not significant at all, emphasising the fact that the exogenous variables do not affect the 
request for personal commitments. The second specification is significant at 99% and both 
INTOV and OVUSED are positively related to COLL and significant between 95% and 99%. 
By examining the second regression, no support for Bester’s (1985) proposition concerning 
interest – collateral pairs is found. In addition, finance characteristics of the firm explain the 
request for personal commitments more than the exogenous general characteristics of the area 
and of the economic context even if only 4.6% of the overall variance. In fact, the covariates 
that are not significant are borderline. 
The specification that considers only the relationship variables is not significant and 
has a very low adjusted R² (the specification explains just 2% of the overall variance). None 
of the variables included is significant except TRUST and LNLENGTH that are significant at 
90% level. What can be derived by looking at the three regressions is that only firm financial 
and operational characteristics affect the request of personal commitments even if they ex-
plain a minor part of the variance. 
 
[Insert Table III here] 
 
Moving on in the analysis, in Table 4 four specifications are presented. The first spec-
ification considers only hard covariates (that is the exogenous variables and firms’ specific 
characteristics); the second enters the relationship covariates except TRUST. This gives us 
the possibility to compare the specification results to the findings of previous research and 
test how relationship variables impact on the request for personal commitments. TRUST is 
entered in the third specification. By entering it separately, we can appreciate how it impacts 
on the model. The last regression is the parsimonious version of the third specification, where 
the covariates that are not significant are dropped. 
 
[Insert Table IV here] 
 
Regressions have adjusted R² values between 0.058 (first specification) and 0.087 
(third specification). Only the last regression is significant at 99% according to the Wald chi
2
 
test: the first one is significant at 98%, the second one at 95%, while the specification with all 
the covariates has a significance level slightly below 90%. It is worth noting that the low lev-
el of the specification significance emerges by using the bootstrap technique for estimating 
the standard errors. In fact, traditional estimation provides apparently stronger results, with 
significance level of the specification always above 99.5%. 
Missing data affects slightly the number of observations in the regressions. T-tests on 
the dependent variable and firm dimension (LNTURNOVER) did not show any significant 
difference at 99% level between datasets. The third (and fourth) specifications support the 
argument that, at variance with our hypothesis, TRUST (and soft variables in general) have 
only a minor role in reducing collateral. In fact, TRUST has the expected sign (negative) but 
it explains only 1% of the overall variance and it is significant only at 90%. Also in other re-
gressions not reported here, it is always significant just above 90%. 
Because of the role played by hard variables and trust, it can be questioned whether 
trust is simply linked to the quality of the firm and that bank managers simply trust good 
firms. In order to test whether trustworthiness is distinct from the quality of the firm, we car-
ried out some additional econometric tests. Firstly we investigated the link between TRUST 
and hard variables: TRUST has a very low correlation with other hard variables (TRUST – 
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TURNOVER 0.057; TRUST – OVUSE -0.135; TRUST INT .0147). In addition, we meas-
ured the correlations between TRUST and two financial performance indicators (ROS, ROE): 
they were not significant and correlations were all less than 0.1. Then, we regressed COLL 
against these indicators (ROS, ROE) and other variables (assets, debtors, equity). Neither the 
regression nor the covariates were significant. This evidence indicates there is no mechanistic 
correlation between bank managers’ trust and firm quality. Similarly, because of the role 
played by relationship variables and trust, it can be questioned whether trust is simply a proxy 
of the quality of the relationship. Thus, we investigated the link between trust and the length 
of the relationships and the intensity of the relationship (BANKMAN, FREQREV 
FREQMEET). In this case the correlations were between +0.0238 (TRUST - FREQREV) 
(and +.1379 (TRUST - LNLEGTH). In addition, the specification with TRUST as a depend-
ent variable and these soft variables as independent variables is not significant and no varia-
ble is significant. Thus, as in the case of performance variables, it is possible to rule out a 
mechanistic correlation between trust and other soft variables. 
Turning attention to other covariates, only competition (NBANK) is significant 
among the exogenous variables (even if only at 90%). Interestingly, hard covariates are sig-
nificant: INTOV is positively related to COLL and is significant. The relationship between 
personal commitments and the amount of short term credit is as expected (even if weak) as 
well as the relationship between OVDUSE and COLL. Managers and shareholders of firms 
with greater turnover (that is bigger and more powerful ones) are not necessarily better off in 
avoiding the provision of personal commitments to the bank. 
It is worth noting that all the relational variables except LNLENGTH do not affect the 
pledging of personal commitments significantly. LNLEGTH’s positive link to the pledging of 
personal commitments supports the proposition that firms suffer bank capture effect. The fre-
quency with which the bank checks the line of credit (FREQREV) is positively linked to per-
sonal commitments (it is not significant but border line). A possible explanation is that the 
riskiest firms are those which are monitored more frequently and are required to provide 
more personal commitments. 
IV.2 Evidence from the Panel of Bank Managers and SME Owner/Managers 
The regression analysis shows that trust has a comparatively small impact on reducing 
the requirement for personal commitments: the significance level of the specifications is quite 
low, suggesting that the model does not capture the determinants of the requirement for per-
sonal guarantees; moreover, TRUST is significant only at 90%. All in all, econometric testing 
suggests a lack of importance of trust and other soft variables. These findings are definitely at 
variance with the findings reported previously in the literature. Thus, further analysis is need-
ed. 
The semi-structured interviews we undertook with bank manager and entrepreneurs 
provided useful insights in clarifying the role of trust. Bank managers clearly stated that, in 
general, they set up the credit conditions at the beginning of the relationship and, then, they 
hardly change them subsequently. More specifically, bank managers tend not to change the 
guarantees they were provided with, as the relationship evolves. A bank manager commented 
that he never accepted a reduction in collateral the owner/managers provided. If anything, he 
asked for additional personal collateral. Possibly, banks are over-hedged when they provide 
credit to successful firms since, as the risk decreases, bank managers do not adjust the request 
for personal commitments accordingly. We questioned bank managers about over-hedging 
and a common comment was that there is nothing wrong in being over-hedged. In fact, over-
hedging can be a sensible strategy from the bank’s point of view, but it is not from the entre-
preneurs’ one. So, why do entrepreneurs not react? 
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Two different explanations can be provided: either the banks exploit a hold up situa-
tion linked to the small size of the SMEs and their inability to switch to another bank; or 
firms’ owners/managers are not very concerned about the personal commitments they pro-
vide to the bank. 
Some entrepreneurs clearly stated that they are not concerned about providing person-
al commitments to the bank since this is the standard way to run the business and to obtain 
finance. Other entrepreneurs stated that they did not remember whether they had provided the 
bank with personal guarantees. One of them asked us if this matters. Some entrepreneurs 
wrongly thought that the bank had not been provided with personal commitments. This incor-
rect belief emerged by crosschecking what the entrepreneurs told us with evidence in the 
bank files. Finally, according to bank managers, entrepreneurs very infrequently ask to be 
unpledged. Indeed, bank managers stressed that this is one of the least common requests and 
usually it is interpreted negatively by the bank. Bank managers are inclined to interpret this 
request as a “warning light”: an attempt by the entrepreneurs to save their personal assets 
when they know their personal assets are at real risk because the situation of the firm is wors-
ening. Thus, paradoxically, when entrepreneurs ask to be unpledged, they effectively pre-
empt the possibility of this happening. 
Even if we cannot dismiss a hold up effect, interviews tended to support the argument 
that entrepreneurs are not greatly concerned whether they are required to provide personal 
collateral. All in all, the combined interpretation of our econometric findings (a weak nega-
tive relationship between trust and personal commitments) and interviews, suggest that banks 
tend to ask for collateral regardless of trust, and that entrepreneurs are generally willing to 
give it to them. This is the result of the apparent inertia of both bank and entrepreneurs with 
regard to dealing with personal collateral. Indeed, the effect of trust is probably linked pri-
marily to trust between bank managers and customers that pre-exists the lending relationship 
and only marginally to the lending relationship. This could happen because bank managers’ 
knowledge of the entrepreneur is based on gossip and information that the bank manager was 
able to access before starting the lending relationship. 
 
V. Conclusions 
The present study is an additional step in the research into the role trust plays in the 
firm-bank relationship. There is some existing research that looks at the role of trust in ac-
cessing venture capital and in developing relationships with business angels. At the same 
time, there is a lack of empirical research into the role of trust in banking relationships. Even 
though it is a contractual relationship, underpinning the potential creditors analysis of the 
risk- return trade-off is an assessment of the trustworthiness of the borrower. 
By approaching the lending relationship from a different perspective, the present re-
search opens a new, interesting perspective on the pledging of personal commitments. We do 
not find clear support for the argument that the decision to require personal commitments is 
affected by trust. We argue that the lack of importance of trust manifest in our regression 
findings, is due to the fact that personal commitments are requested at the beginning of the 
relationship (when trust tends to be low) and that there is thereafter some inertia in both the 
bank system and in entrepreneurs in reducing private collateral: the entrepreneurs do not 
seem to be concerned about the additional personal wealth they implicitly invest in the ven-
ture as personal commitments; loan managers are happy to be provided with extra hedging. 
However, this study does have limitations which imply that the results should not be 
generalised but, rather are indications of future research directions. 
Firstly, the data used are cross sectional. Future research could employ longitudinal 
studies to examine the relationship between the assessment of the entrepreneur-managers’ 
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trustworthiness at the time of lending and the behaviour ex post. In particular, such an ap-
proach could help to test whether our conjecture about the role of trust at the beginning of the 
relationship instead of during it is correct. An additional limitation but potentially an area for 
further investigation might be to test the hypotheses in regions with a different cultural back-
ground, mainly to investigate if such a state of mind about personal commitments is general 
or country/region specific. Thirdly, it could be interesting to investigate why entrepre-
neurs/managers of SMEs are not concerned about the guarantees provided. It could also be 
interesting to investigate whether changes in the value of personal assets provided as guaran-
tees affect the lending decisions of the banks. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of the dataset and context, the study indicates that 
trust (and soft information in general) plays only a minor role in lending relationships. 
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Table I – Trust indicators (ability, benevolence and integrity) and Factor Analysis (N=457) 
Var. Description Mean St.Dev
. 
Factor1 
TRUST 
Uniqueness Source 
ab1 
The entrepreneur knows 
very well the market in 
which she/he operates  
4.11 
 
.71  0.7268 0.4717 Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
ab2 
The entrepreneur is able 
in selecting the needed 
resources 
3.71 
 
.80  0.7139 0.4908 Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
ab3 
The entrepreneur is able 
in managing the re-
sources 
3.80 
 
.78  0.7764  0.3973   Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
ab4 
The entrepreneur is able 
in understanding market 
evolution 
3.81 .78 0.7450  0.4449   Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
ben1 
The entrepreneur adapts 
his interests to suit those 
of commercial partners 
3.78 .70  0.7599  0.4226   Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
Bromiley, P., and 
J. Harris, 2006 
ben2 
The entrepreneur pays 
attention to the needs of 
the employees 
3.54 .75  0.6566  0.5688   Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
Bromiley, P., and 
J. Harris, 2006 
ben3 
The entrepreneur is very 
involved in the commu-
nity 
3.09 1.17   Bromiley, P., and 
J. Harris, 2006 
int1 
The entrepreneur is to-
tally honest in negotia-
tions with commercial 
partners 
3.88 .72  0.6437 0.5856   Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
Bromiley, P., and 
J. Harris, 2006 
int2 
The entrepreneur is con-
sistent in his decisions 
and behaviour 
3.81 .69  0.7417  0.4499   Mayer and Davis 
(1999); Jarvenpaa 
et al, (1998) 
int3 
You would be happy to 
recommend to a female 
friend to work in the 
firm 
3.43 .95  0.7051  0.5079 Bromiley, P., and 
J. Harris, 2006; 
Currall and 
Judge, 1995 
  
Andrea Moro, Mike R. Lucas, Devendra Kodwani/The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance 
16 (2012) 
 
72 
 
Table II Summary statistics of variables used (N= 457) 
Variable Description Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Commitments (0=no commit-
ments; 1=commitments) = per-
sonal and firm assets 
COLL1 .8110 
 
 0 
18.90% 
1 
81.10% 
Used debt (in percentage) = per-
centage of the rolling credit facili-
ty used 
OVDUSE  60.67% 
 
35.62 0 132 
Typology of Bank (0 = Local; 1 = 
National) 
LOCNAT .8153 
 
 0 
18.47% 
1 
81.53% 
Interest rate on overdraft – per-
centage (N =444) 
INTOV 5.35 1.43 1 12.75 
Number of banks in the area NBANKS  6.92 
 
4.04           1 12 
Region (0=Alto Adige; 1=Friuli)  REGION 1  .1275 
 
 0 
87.25% 
1 
12.75% 
Bank of Italy coefficient about 
expectations in increasing (posi-
tive) or reducing (negative) rigidi-
ty in providing new/additional 
credit 
ECON  .059 
 
.39 0 .17 
Turnover of the firm for the most 
recent complete financial year 
(absolute values in thousands) - € 
LNTURNOVR  2,205,000 
 
4,629,000 13,000 46,900,00
0 
Length of the relationship in 
years 
LNLENGTH  10.34 7.72 0 35 
Short Term Credit Provided - € LNSTD 299,099 638,697 0 7,500,000 
Frequency of reviewing = number 
of reviewing in a year 
FREQREV  2.04 
 
.48 1 3 
Frequency of meetings = times of 
meetings in a year 
FREQMEET  2.95 
 
1.23 1 4 
Number of bank managers in-
volved in the relation (N =452) 
MANAGER 1.59 1.16 1 7 
Multiple relationship with this 
bank (0=no other bank products, 
1=other bank products)  
MULTI 1 
  
.58.02 
 
 0 
41.98 
1 
58.02 
Trust (Factor) - standardised PCA TRUST -9.34e-10 1.00 -4.24 2.24 
1
 Dummy variable (mean and standard deviation meaningless 
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Table III – Regression findings 
Exogenous Model Hard Variables Model Relationship Model 
Number of obs 455 Number of obs 422 Number of obs 450 
Replications 750 Replications 750 Replications 750 
Wald chi2(4) 4.22 Wald chi2(4) 16.16 Wald chi2(6) 9.75 
Prob > chi2 0.3461 Prob > chi2 0.0028 Prob > chi2 0.1357 
Log likelihood -218.6694 Log likelihood -191.1557 Log likelihood -213.392 
Pseudo R2 0.0087 Pseudo R2 0.0458 Pseudo R2 0.0215 
  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  
  Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
E
x
o
g
en
o
u
s LOCNAT -.40311 .47705        
NBANKS .07242 .04549        
REGION -.17193 .60235        
ECON -.13357 4.4531        
H
ar
d
 INTOV    .35396 .10478 ***    
OVUSED    .00861 .00390 **    
LNTURNOVR    .17048 .11116     
LNSTD    .19491 .12079     
R
el
at
io
n
al
 
LNLENGTH       .19350 .15089 * 
FREQREV       .43533 .25412  
FREQMEET       -.01269 .11274  
BANKMAN       .08543 .15596  
MULTI       .14679 .26263  
TRUST       -.24476 .13011 * 
 _CONS 1.0775 .42353 *** -5.4976 2.2058 ** .03980 .62358  
* Sig. at 90% 
** Sig. at 95% 
*** Sig. at 99% 
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Table IV – Regression findings 
Number of obs 422 Number of obs 417 Number of obs 417 Number of obs 422 
Replications 750 Replications 750 Replications 750 Replications 750 
Wald chi2(8) 19.60 Wald chi2(13) 22.16 Wald chi2(14) 20.73 Wald chi2(9) 23.93 
Prob > chi2 0.0120 Prob > chi2 0.0530 Prob > chi2 0.1089 Prob > chi2 0.0044 
Log likelihood -191.5524 Log likelihood -185.3007 Log likelihood -183.4161 Log likelihood -188.8478 
Pseudo R2 0.0585 Pseudo R2 0.0779 Pseudo R2 0.0873 Pseudo R2 0.0718 
  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  Observed Bootstrap  
  Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
E
x
o
g
en
o
u
s LOCNAT -.89812 .63994  -.79494 .81820  -.83830 .79037  `   
NBANKS .08549 .06040  .13129 .07772 * .14035 .07808 * .03475 .04051  
REGION -.87432 .82204  -1.0778 .97064  -1.2980 .96159  -.63628 .42204  
ECON 2.1907 6.2888  4.7864 7.9039  6.1056 7.4398     
H
ar
d
 INTOV .41743 .12053 *** .39893 .13359 *** .39739 .13992 *** .36469 .11873 *** 
OVUSE .00892 .00386 ** .00843 .00431 ** .00774 .00450 * .00805 .00393 ** 
LNSTD .22558 .13335 * .17133 .14326  .21319 .14661  .22558 .13335 * 
LNTURNOVR .15736 .13470  .20031 .14080  .20275 .15004  .15736 .13470  
R
el
at
io
n
al
 
LNLENGTH    .25146 .17894  .30393 .20073  .30348 .16797 * 
FREQREV    .42619 .36147  .45611 .39030  .41519 .28781  
FREQMEET    -.03729 .12994  -.02651 .12893     
BANKMAN    .23651 .23861  .26567 .22389     
MULTI    .17619 .29803  .16082 .29562     
TRUST       -.27634 .16117 * -.23656 .13947 * 
 _CONS -6.4416 2.6354 *** -8.4339 2.9413 *** -9.2225 3.1758 *** -7.1806 2.4320 *** 
* Sig. at 90% 
** Sig. at 95% 
*** Sig. at 99% 
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